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The relation between informed trading and volatility is analysed using the change in 
the proportion of informed transactions calculated through the Probability of Informed 
Trading variable (PIN). The analysis relates to the Spanish market during 1997-2010, 
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in size and have a lower trading volume and inferior quality of information. The 
methodology is based on a modification of the model proposed by Avramov et al 
[2006]. Our proposal incorporates the change in the proportion of informed transactions, 
calculated with intraday data, into the volatility model. The results are also presented 
using a conditional volatility model in which the change in the proportion of informed 
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Volatility is a key factor in financial analysis given its importance for, inter alia, 
stock valuation, risk management, portfolio formation and market efficiency. In fact, 
unexpected price fluctuations, depending on their intensity, can confound the most 
carefully thought-out expectations and render expert recommendations useless. In an 
ideal world, volatility could be explained through the arrival of unexpected information. 
However, fear, risk aversion and other psychological factors can influence the 
processing of information on the part of agents in such a way that price variation will be 
more or less intense depending on subjective perceptions. 
The trading in financial assets during a specific session provides a basic time 
framework for volatility analysis. Each transaction can in fact involve additional 
unexpected information and psychological biases that in turn generate new price 
variations. These variations are important for everyday investors’ decisions although 
they do not necessarily induce immediate changes in their views about fundamental 
pricing variables or in their risk aversion strategies. Sims [1984] and Lehmann [1990] 
suggest that the prices of assets follow a martingale-like process over very short time 
intervals, since changes in the fundamentals are barely perceptible during a session in 
which unexpected information arrives. Cochrane [2001] argues that it is impossible for 
risk aversion to change on a daily or longer term basis. Therefore, it is possible to think 
in terms of a close connection between the microstructure of the market and the 
intensity of asset volatility (see, among others, Amihud et al [1990], Bianco and Renò, 
[2006] or Awartani et al [2009]). 
The relationship between investor behaviour and market volatility was identified by 
Friedman [1953]. He pointed out that irrational investors have the effect of destabilising 
prices, since they buy when prices are high and sell when prices are low, while rational 
investors move prices towards their fundamentals, as they buy when prices are low and 
sell when they are high. Along similar lines, and using the theory of Noisy Rational 
Expectations, Hellwig [1980] and Wang [1993] claim that volatility increases with 
liquidity or uninformed trading because the price changes generated by uninformed 
negotiation tend to revert. In Hellwig’s model [1980], information arriving in the 
market is aggregated in the prices through the actions of risk-averse agents, 
heterogeneously informed agents who individually do not have excessive influence on 
prices. In general, informed traders influence stock prices by stepping in to profit if they 
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observe that prices temporarily deviate from their fundamentals. The greater the 
numbers of informed agents, the more precise are the informative signals and their 
impact on prices reduces the deviations from the fundamentals. However, noisy 
information aggregation leads to excess price volatility. Wang [1993] observed that 
information asymmetry can increase volatility because uninformed investors frequently 
take positions following the trend. This behaviour, despite being uninformed trading, 
can be rational for less informed investors if they find themselves in an asymmetric 
information environment. Furthermore, Cutler et al [1990] and De Long et al [1990] 
found that positive feedback investment strategies can originate an excess of volatility 
even in the presence of rational informed investors if, for example, these rational 
informed investors find it interesting to appear to jump on the bandwagon and not to 
buck the trend followed by noise traders, in the hope of selling (buying) at a much 
higher (lower) price tomorrow. 
The model developed by Campbell et al [1993] is useful for distinguishing between 
informed and uninformed transactions. This model establishes that a fall in prices may 
be attributed to new negative information or to excessive selling pressure provoked by 
herding. In the first case, there is no reason to expect subsequent price changes. In the 
second case, a subsequent correction to the excessive selling pressure may be expected 
with an increase in prices. In other words, informed agents will generate null 
autocorrelation returns, just as uninformed agents or imitators will generate non-null 
autocorrelation returns. 
More recently this relationship has been documented by Avramov et al [2006] 
(hereinafter ACG06). According to these authors, the activities of both imitative and 
non-imitative investors have a significant effect on day-to-day volatility, although in 
different directions. ACG06 checks whether the fact that there is herding behaviour 
causes an increase in volatility while informed trading causes a decrease. It does this by 
classifying sales transactions as herding or mimetic and contrarian in order to identify 
each of the above-mentioned types of behaviour. The classification is based on the 
relation between residual return and sales transactions. The authors establish that 
contrarian sales are informed sales and that they reduce volatility while imitative sales 
increase it. 
 From a different perspective the PIN variable (probability of informed trading) 
obtained from the microstructure model given by Easley et al [1997] has assumed 
importance as an explanation of several market characteristics and variables such as 
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stock splits, cross-sectional expected returns, ownership structure or market efficiency 
(see, among others, Dennis and Weston [2001], Easley et al [2001], Easley et al [2002], 
or Vega [2006]). The PIN variable captures the degree of asymmetry in trading so that 
its use can help to better understand the relationship between informed trading and 
volatility. To the best of our knowledge, three works have dealt with this relationship. 
Marsh et al [2008] analysed the relationship between the PIN variable and asset 
volatility in the USA and found a negative relation between them. Poskitt [2005], 
studying the Australian market, detected a negative correlation between PIN and 
volatility. Indirectly, Lai et al [2014] have also found a similar correlation in some 
international markets. 
In line with these studies, the aim of the present paper is to analyse the relationship 
between volatility and information at the market microstructure level and to attempt to 
determine whether informed trading influences volatility and how this occurs in the 
Spanish Stock Market, using the PIN variable for calculating our informed trading 
measure. From a complementary perspective, the paper of Blasco et al. [2012] finds 
evidence in the Spanish market of how trading through imitation has a significant 
positive influence on volatility. Furthermore, the greater the level of herding detected, 
the greater the anticipated volatility. In the light of these results, this study considers the 
Spanish market to be the ideal setting for reaching the intended objective: to examine in 
depth the behaviour of daily informed trading as complementary to daily imitative 
trading. Given the above indications, we might expect to find a negative correlation 
between the informed trading variable and volatility. 
The Spanish market differs from the American market in various other respects 
which makes its study worthwhile. Informed trading can be conditioned by the 
informative environment and the characteristics of the stock market. Following the 
information provided by Lai et al [2009], the proxies used as measures of the financial 
disclosure environment and of the corporate governance environment have values in 
Spain 50% lower than the equivalent values in the USA (financial transparency factor 
0.88 versus 1.59; disclosure requirements index 0.50 versus 1.00 and anti-self-dealing-
index 0.37 versus 0.65). This suggests that the Spanish market is more opaque than the 
traditionally studied USA market. Moreover, considering the assessments of financial 
analysts as a source of information, the values of errors in their predictions and the 
differences in their recommendations are more than twice as much in Spain as in the 
USA. Additionally, as measures of insider ownership and institutional holding and 
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trading, it can be said that the proportion of stocks closely held by insiders and 
controlling shareholders is much greater in Spain (0.44/0.17). Significant differences are 
also found when measuring the proportion of stocks held or traded by foreign mutual 
funds (2.92/0.39 and 1.88/0.92), or when the proportion of stocks held or traded by 
domestic funds is quantified (3.58/17.77 and 1.09/5.63). All these data reveal a market 
with inferior informative quality than the American market, which presupposes a greater 
effect of informed trading on the market in general and on volatility in particular. 
While the objective coincides in part with the paper of ACG06, the contribution of 
this study is threefold. First, it gives a different perspective for studying the concept of 
informed transactions using an explanatory variable that we consider to be more 
appropriate than that mentioned in ACG06. This variable is directly influenced by the 
probability of informed trading (PIN), generally accepted (Easley et al [1996, 1997, 
2002, 2008 and 2010], among others) as an informed trading measure in the literature. 
The second contribution is the study of the Spanish market which, as already 
mentioned, has characteristics different from those of the American market. It is of 
interest for its greater informative opacity. Thirdly, this work includes an analysis of the 
relation between volatility and informed trading taking into account the differentiation 
between types of stock. The relation between volatility and PIN studied in the literature 
does not consider specific volatility models and has treated stock markets as a whole. 
Nevertheless, Barberis and Shleifer [2003] suggest that investors are prone to 
“categorization” and treat certain members of certain groups of stocks (such as small 
cap stocks) as being more similar than the fundamentals would suggest. As a result, 
categorization produces common factors in returns to stocks in the same group. Given 
that the literature has shown that the probability of informed trading is greater for 
smaller sized stocks, it might be assumed that the stabilising effect of informed trading 
would be greater for this type of stock than for stocks of greater size. However, taking 
into account the varying intensity of the presence of institutional investors in the 
different types of stock, as well as other characteristics of the informative environment, 
this result might not be so predictable. This work examines this question which is not 
considered in previous studies. 
This paper thus takes the test proposed by ACG06 as a starting point and suggests 
some variations of the model in order to improve the interpretation and clarity of the 
results. We use a less constrictive variable for approaching informed trading that 
involves both current and delayed information: the change in the ratio of informed 
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transactions, calculated using the probability of informed trading. The role of all the 
transactions undertaken is taken into account so that unlike ACG06 we offer the 
possibility that both selling and buying activity incorporate information. For the 
purposes of comparison and in order to test the robustness of the results, the paper also 
includes conditional volatility models modified by the inclusion of the informed trading 
variable, enabling the volatility persistence to be incorporated into our analysis. 
A further relevant aspect of this study is the use of intraday information to measure 
the probability of informed trading. As mentioned before, we believe this frequency of 
data to be the most appropriate for trying to detect the effect of informed and 
uninformed transactions on volatility. The method selected for classifying the type of 
transaction includes a separate group for zero tick transactions (no price change) so that 
possible classification problems can be avoided. In the Spanish market we find that, on 
average, the probability of rise or fall sequences is 60% while zero-tick sequences occur 
in the time interval under study with a probability of 40%. For this reason we consider it 
important to avoid misleading results caused by bias in the classification of transactions. 
Furthermore, the time period analyzed is long enough to dilute any biases due to 
temporary market fluctuations, despite the outbreak of the financial crisis.  
The results obtained are of particular relevance for gaining a deeper insight into the 
roles of the market and, given that good prediction of volatility is a key factor in 
investment decisions, they could be useful for defining new risk measures, for portfolio 
management or for coverage strategies. In fact, Crépey [2004] explains how market 
complexity and incompleteness of the volatility measures are drawbacks that call for a 
recalibration of the models used for risk management. More recently, Andersen et al 
[2011] suggest that the detrimental impact of microstructure noise on the accuracy of 
forecasting can be substantial. Knowing which variables affect volatility and how they 
do this could be of considerable help when seeking more accurate predictions of 
volatility. Furthermore, knowing the relationship between volatility and information is 
fundamental for both market regulators and academics. On the one hand, regulators 
need to reduce information asymmetry to make stock markets more transparent. In fact 
they make regulations and develop institutional infrastructures in order to provide 
investors with equal access to information. On the other hand, academics have analysed 
the interaction between informed and uninformed investors, and shown that the relation 




The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the database. Section 3 
explains the calculation of the probability of the informed trading variable together with 
a description of its constituent elements. The methodology and principal results are 
given in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions are set out in Section 5.  
 
2.-Database 
The data used in this analysis were provided by the Sociedad de Bolsas SA and by 
Datastream (Thomson Financial). The period analysed was from 1 January 1997 to 31 
December 2010. The study of the relation between volatility and informed trading was 
undertaken on a daily frequency basis. This frequency is usual for this type of study, as 
can be seen in Campbell et al [1993], Jones et al [1994], Chan and Fong [2000], 
Chordia et al [2001] or Kao and Fung [2012], among others. However, databases with 
different frequencies, daily and intraday, are used in the paper. The daily database 
collects the stock returns, calculated through closing prices, the trading volume 
calculated in two ways (the number of transactions and the number of stocks), 
capitalisation, turnover, book-to-market and the number of transactions initiated by 
buyers and sellers necessary for calculating the PIN variable. The latter data does not 
appear as such in the available databases and has to be estimated using intraday data. 
Thus intraday information has been used for the calculation of the probability of 
informed trading. The intraday database collects together all the transactions conducted 
during the period. For each transaction the date, the exact time in hours, minutes and 
seconds, the broker code, the price and the trading volume (in number of stocks) are 
specified. Operations conducted outside the normal market trading hours have been 
omitted from the analysis, both before the official opening of each session and after the 
market closed1. The usual trading hours at the beginning of the sample period (1997) 
were from 10.00 am to 17.00 pm. These were extended progressively until being fixed 
in 2003 from 9:00 am to 17:30 pm. 
This information enables the number of daily purchases and sales to be obtained, for 
which an algorithm needs to be applied in order to determine the type of transactions. 
                                                 
1 The reason for excluding trades outside normal hours is that these operate under a different trading 
mechanism than that used during the rest of the day.  
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Following the lines established by authors such as Lyons [1995] or Sias and Starks 
[1997], the transactions can be identified with the tick test2.  
Each session has a total number of transactions calculated as the sum of buying 
transactions, selling transactions, and zero-tick transactions, in other words those which 
cannot be accurately classified as purchases or sales. The zero-tick division does not 
appear in ACG06. We have included it in order to avoid our results suffering from an 
element of bias owing to the inclusion of transactions that cannot strictly be determined 
one way or the other. 
For estimation purposes, we have selected a wide variety of stocks3 so that their 
parameters of capitalisation, turnover, return and book-to-market can be considered 
representative of the diversity of the stock market as a whole. The selection criterion 
was to identify stocks with the highest, average and lowest values for all the variables 
mentioned and select those with the highest repetition rate within the whole set of 
variables. The set of stocks selected represents 94.53% of the market capitalisation of 
the Spanish stock exchange.  
 
3.-Calculation of the PIN variable 
The PIN variable is a function of the flow of abnormal orders (under excessive 
buying or selling pressure) attributable to private information or to a different 
interpretation by agents of public information. The usual approach in market 
microstructure that public information is directly incorporated into prices more than 
being reflected in the flow of orders does not always appear to be verified, given that 
there is practical evidence that extraordinary flows also take place when public 
information exists about which agents have different interpretations. In this case, it may 
be that private signals received by an agent derive from public information that is 
difficult to interpret (see Kim and Verrecchia [1994, 1997], Chung et al [2005], Saffi 
                                                 
2 There are alternative ways of classifying a transaction as being initiated by the buyer or by the seller.  
Finucane (2000) shows that the tick-test method produces similar results to those of other classification 
methods. Given this finding and the fact that there is no database available which includes the bid-ask 
differential, we have decided to use the tick-test to classify operations. Specifically, a transaction is 
classified as being initiated by the buyer if the price of the transaction is higher than that of the previous 
transaction (up-tick), and as initiated by the seller if the transaction price is lower than that of the previous 
transaction (down-tick). If there is no price difference between a transaction and the previous transaction, 
it is classified as zero-tick. 
3 The estimation of the PIN variable with intraday data involves a very high number of iterations and a 
high computational cost. It was therefore decided to take a representative majority of stocks traded on the 
Spanish stock exchange. This takes into account criteria including the whole range of traded stocks in 
terms of size, liquidity and volatility. 
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[2007] or Chen et al [2007]). The present paper takes this approach, proposing that the 
PIN variable is not exclusively a measure of strictly private information but that it also 
includes information from investors who are especially adept at processing public 
information.  
Given that information-based trading is unobservable, a model is required for making 
deductions. This paper follows the market microstructure model proposed by Easley et 
al [1996, 1997] and Easley et al [2002]. This can be described as a learning model in 
which agents observe market data, make inferences about its true underlying value, and 
incorporate it modifying the values of the stocks they trade. Easley et al [2002] model a 
market in which a competitive market maker trades a stock with informed and 
uninformed traders4. Information events occur between trading days with probability . 
The probability of this being bad news is δ and the probability that it is good news is (1-
δ). Uninformed investors or liquidity traders buy and sell stocks for reasons exogenous 
to the model. Their sell and buy orders arrive in the market according to a Poisson-
independent distribution with arrival rates εb for buy orders and εs for sell orders. 
Informed investors trade for speculative reasons; if they receive good news they will 
buy the stock and if they receive bad news they will sell it. The arrival rate of orders 
from informed agents is assumed to follow a Poisson process and is identified as . 
PIN is defined as the estimation of the arrival rate of informed investors divided by 








       (1)
 
where +b+s is the arrival rate of all transactions and  is the arrival rate of 
information-based orders. The estimation of the parameters is made following Easley et 
al [2010]. The underlying likelihood function in the model for all purchases and sales 
on any single trading day is a mixture of three Poisson probabilities weighted by the 
probability of having good news, bad news or no news on that day. This function is as 
follows: 
                                                 
4The figure of the market-maker does not specifically exist in the Spanish market, but the trades placed 
through the order book enable solicited transactions to be observed. The experimental study of 


















































   
(2) 
where B is the total number of purchases (operations initiated by the buyer) and S the 
total number of sales (operations initiated by the seller) for one day and θ = {εs,εb,, μ, α, 
δ} is the initial vector of the structural parameters. Easley et al [2010] recommend the 
factorization of the maximum likelihood function to make its calculation easier, 
increasing computational efficiency and reducing truncation errors. Following these 
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Maximising the likelihood function with respect to the parameters θ = {εs,εb,, μ, α, δ} 
is done separately for each stock and for each year. This gives us the corresponding 
parameter estimates per stock and year during the sample period.  
Lin and Ke [2011] recommend a different factorization in order to mitigate the 
downwards bias in PIN estimates. A comparison made by Yan and Zhang [2012] shows 
that the estimate based on the Easley et al [2010] factorization is systematically smaller 
than the estimate based on the Lin and Ke [2011] factorization. Nevertheless, they also 
find that boundary solutions appear with a very high frequency when the LK 
factorization is used. Boundary solutions can cause a systematic bias in the estimate of 
PIN. Yan and Zhang [2012] suggest that it is necessary to use the LK factorization 
together with their algorithm to obtain an estimate of PIN using 125 sets of initial values 
and choosing either the boundary solution or the non-boundary solution, if possible, 
with the highest value of the objective function as the maximum likelihood estimate. In 
this paper we have used the proposal by Easley et al [2010] 5 together with the Yan and 
                                                 
5 The Newton-Raphson method has been used for maximizing the likelihood function in equation (3). 
This method was used by authors such as Brockman and Chung (2003), Brown and Cliff (2004), Pang et 
al (2007) or Lin and Ke (2011), among others. 
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Zhang [2012] algorithm for choosing initial values6. Table I shows the mean estimation 
of the parameters εs, εb,, μ, α, δ for all stocks at an annual frequency. It can be seen that 
the estimated parameters have values similar to those found in the literature (see, Benos 
and Jochec [2007], Li and Zhang [2008], Choi [2009], Duarte and Young [2009], Aslan 
et al [2011] or Lai et al [2014], among others). The percentage of boundary solutions 
for α estimate is 1.28%. The percentage of boundary solutions for δ estimates is 
15.86%. We also estimate that the Yan and Zhang algorithm enables us to improve the 
maximum likelihood estimate in about 14.44% of the cases with respect to a fixed initial 
combination of reference values εb=1.0, εs=2.0, δ=0.58, α=0.12 and μ=1.35 selected 
after various preliminary trials.  
Table II shows the PIN estimates aggregated for the stocks classified by size into 
stocks with higher, medium or lower capitalization. The results in panels A (annual 
estimation means for the total period) and B (annual estimation means for periods 
before and during/after financial crisis) clearly show that large companies have lower 
PIN variable values than small companies. This result is consistent with those obtained 
by Mohanram and Rajgopal [2009], Marsh and Nagayasu [2009], Popescu and Kumar 
[2010], Aslan et al [2011] or Lai et al [2009], among others. These authors have found 
an apparent inverse ratio between the size of the stocks and their PIN variables. The 
result is also consistent with results relating to the concentration of uninformed trading 
(herding) in large companies owing to the familiarity and the quality of the information 
(Palomino [1996], Sias [2004], Lin, et al [2009] or Blasco et al [2009], among others). 
Therefore, the size of the company can be considered as a relevant characteristic for 
attracting informed trading, given that large companies are greatly preferred by the 
majority of groups of uninformed investors. These companies are more visible 
(transparent) and easier to follow, so that uninformed investors are attracted by them. In 
contrast, small companies, being more opaque, concentrate the activities of informed 
investors. The cost of finding information, both financial and in terms of time seems to 
lie behind this phenomenon. 
 
4-Methodology and empirical results. 
4.1-Calculating volatility 
                                                 
6 We have also used the Lin and Ke (2011) factorization. Nevertheless, we do not find higher estimates 
than the estimates based on the Easley et al (2010) factorization, and boundary solutions appear with a 
very high frequency. 
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Daily volatility will be obtained in a similar manner to that proposed by Schwert 
[1990], Jones et al [1994], Chan and Fong [2000] or ACG06. It is calculated as the 
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where Rit is the return of stock i on day t, Dkt are the dummy variables corresponding 
to each day of the week, NSit  is the number of sales transactions of stock i on day t, NTit 
is the total number of transactions of stock i on day t, and s is the number of lags 
included to avoid autocorrelation problems7. The ratio of both variables (NS and NT) is 
representative of the sales activity and is a control variable that captures negative return 
and orthogonalizes the residual variable to this information. Although there are simpler 
ways of obtaining the residual to approximate volatility, this expression enables some 
estimation problems revealed in the literature to be overcome and therefore the absolute 
value of the residual, denominated | tiu , |, will be our first volatility estimate. 
Table III shows the estimations of the parameters of the proposed equation for 
obtaining the volatility by means of the absolute value of the residual. The estimation 
data is shown in disaggregated quintiles in order to examine the results in greater detail.   
The results are quite uniform for all the stocks analysed. The dummy variables 
representing the days of the week are basically positive and significant. The lags in 
return significantly and negatively influence the actual return, this being especially 
evident in the first lag in the case of small companies. In addition, as would be 
expected, the significant negative estimate of sales activity logically induces a reduction 
in prices. 
 
4.2- ACG06 Model 
Our first objective is to clarify the influence of informed trading in the model put 
forward in ACG06.  
In this model, the information base to define the type of transaction is found in the 
residual of the previous regression. The residual tiu ,  is associated with the unexpected 
return of stock i on day t. During a trading session with unexpected positive returns, the 
sales transactions are associated with contrarian or informed transactions. In a trading 
                                                 
7 This number is not the same for all stocks and depends on the autocorrelation detected. The range varies 
from 1 to 5 lags. 
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session with unexpected negative returns, the sales transactions are linked to the 
mimetic effect or uninformed trading. 
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where )0( itu  is a variable with a value of 1 if itu is not negative and zero otherwise. 
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where )0( itu is a variable with a value of 1 if itu  is negative and zero otherwise.  
The underlying idea is that sales transactions in the presence of falling prices are 
identified with herding transactions, while in the presence of rising prices sales 
transactions are identified with information showing an opinion opposite to that 
prevalent in the market at the time. The authors also conjecture that herding trades are 
uninformed and contrarian trades are informed. Furthermore, when the lagged 
unexpected return is negative, selling activity governs the increase in subsequent 
volatility; when the lagged unexpected return is positive, selling activity governs the 
volatility decline during the next period. This suggests that selling activity is the source 
of the asymmetric volatility phenomenon. 
ACG06 evaluate the impact of informed and uninformed sales transactions by means 
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(8)
 
where Mt is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 on Mondays and zero on other days, 
NTi,t is the variable associated with the trading volume in stock i on day t8 and NSi,t 
                                                 
8 This variable is included because there are numerous papers in the empirical financial literature that 
show a positive and significant relation between volume and volatility (Karpoff (1987), Gallant et al 
(1992), Jones et al (1994), Epps and Epps (1997), O´Hara, (1995) and Chan and Fong (2000, 2006), 
among others). The two paradigms that attempt to explain this relationship are the mixture of distributions 
(Epps and Epps, [1997]) and the microstructure paradigm (O´Hara, [1995]). From a number of empirical 
studies that use different measures of volume to test these paradigms, we have taken Jones, et al (1994), 
Chan and Fong (2000, 2006) and ACG06. Following these papers, we use two different measures of 
volume: the total number of transactions and the total number of stocks traded.  
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represents the number of transactions initiated by the seller in stock i on day t. The 
equation also includes the lags (s) of the dependent variable for taking into account the 
volatility persistence9.  
In this expression the impact of sales transactions on volatility is classified 
depending on whether the unexpected return is positive or negative, so it can be 
expected that: 
02,1,  ii dd        (9) 
However, it should be remembered that because contrarian transactions, according to 
the established premises, should reduce volatility while herding transactions should 
increase it, both coefficients should be negative given the sign of the residuals that 
accompany them. 
Table IV shows the estimations of the model proposed in ACG06. In general the 
positive correlation of the volatility is shown as well as the importance of volume as an 
explanatory variable, given that these variables appear significant. However, the 
ultimate objective of this analysis concerns the issue of whether the parameters 
associated with informed and uninformed trading influence volatility, and this is not so 
conclusive. In fact, when studying the effect of informed trading on volatility, parameter 
d1, this appears significant in the group of medium-sized companies (quintile 3) but 
with the opposite sign to that expected. This does not suggest that informed trading 
reduces volatility. When observing the effect of uninformed trading on volatility, the 
effect appears significant in the case of companies belonging to the first quintile. In 
92% of cases, the presence of mimetic behaviour is observed together with increases in 
volatility10. A look at the results suggests that, in general, the test followed by ACG06 
does not allow the starting hypothesis that informed trading induces lower volatility to 
be accepted, given that the results cannot be generalised when obtaining contrasting 
evidence. Therefore, in following this study it does not seem entirely clear that the type 
of trading (specifically informed trading) has a direct effect on volatility. Our results 
coincide with those given in ACG06 on the negative sign of the coefficient associated 
with imitative or uninformed trading for stocks in the first quintile. However, in our 
study significant results are not appreciated for informed trading, while they are 
                                                 
9 The number of lags included varies for stocks depending on the significance of the correlation. 
10For reasons of clarity only the results when the volume is approximated by the number of transactions 
are shown. The conclusions obtained from the results when the volume is approximated by the number of 




significant in the cited study. These differences could be a result of the Spanish market 
being different from the American, or that the variables considered in ACG06 as 
informed and uninformed trading are unable to capture the essence of the type of trading 
in the Spanish market and therefore do not allow their possible effects to be detected. 
Furthermore, in the Spanish market the effect of herding on volatility has been 
demonstrated using alternative measures to those used by ACG06 for all stocks 
regardless of their size. This raises questions about the general validity of the ACG06 
measures for both informed and uninformed trading in markets other than the American 
market. In our opinion, the proposal of ACG06 suffers from some limitations for more 
opaque markets and this leads us to put forward the following arguments and an 
alternative proposal. 
 
4.3-Discussion of the ACG06 model and alternative proposal.  
The model presented in ACG06 uses a daily volatility estimate constructed on the 
basis of the unexpected return of a complete trading session that, in turn, depends on 
some lagged variables representing informed and uninformed trading. The market 
microstructure, however, is rich in changes. The arrival of new information drives the 
dynamics of a trading session. The different reactions of informed and uninformed 
agents to such new information will induce changes in prices during the session. 
Glosten and Milgron [1985] and Kyle [1985] claim that the aggregation of transactions 
of informed and uninformed investors is what produces the trading volume. Therefore, 
we should take account of this wealth of informational and transactional detail in order 
to obtain complete and general conclusions. 
An agent’s decision to buy or sell in the market is generally taken for two reasons: 
information or liquidity. In the former case, the agent takes a strategic stance in relation 
to other agents reacting quickly to the arrival of news. In the case of liquidity or lack of 
information, the agent may act immediately or at the end of a sequence of imitative 
actions in the light of previous reactions of other agents who have made decisions 
beforehand, or the agent could even react in later sessions. In other words, not all 
transactions initiated by buyers or sellers respond to information, independently of the 
unexpected returns, and not all transactions addressed by liquidity or the herding effect 
take place in the same session. They could occur after some delay. These reactions and 
their intensity may be influenced by the information environment of the stock market. 
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An analysis of the ACG06 model, considering the sales transactions contrary to the 
unexpected returns of the previous day to be informed transactions, begs the following 
questions:  
- What value is being placed on the adept processing of information? An informed 
professional agent should react almost immediately to the arrival of new information, 
and in fact this is what is defined by the concept of market efficiency. Therefore, 
informed trading should have a negative impact at least on volatility generated during 
the same session. More precisely, as the number of informed transactions increases 
during the trading session, volatility should decrease as informed traders move prices to 
their fundamental value. 
- As regards the lagged explanatory variables in the ACG06 model, what can explain 
the unexpected positive return in a session when informed sales transactions have 
occurred? There are two probable explanations: new positive information has arrived 
during the session and sequences of informed buy transactions and rising prices have 
been more intense, or there are buy transactions governed by liquidity or imitation of a 
previous informed buy negotiation (even from a previous session). Furthermore, agents 
governed by imitative criteria imitate the decision, not the price. This suggests that 
perhaps part of the sales decisions that were contrary to unexpected returns were not 
addressed by information, but by imitation. According to the findings of Kittiakaraskun 
et al [2011], sales activity during a trading session is not necessarily dominated by a 
specific type of operator (informed or uninformed) and the price formation process 
occurs through the actions of different groups of agents with heterogeneous opinions 
and criteria. Thus, lagged contrary sales transactions may not be exclusively a good 
proxy for informed trading, particularly in those environments with an intense herding 
level. In fact, the wide variety of circumstances deriving from the arrival of good and 
bad news and the subsequent reaction of informed traders, as well as the interaction of 
informed and uniformed traders who respond to liquidity needs both from a buying or a 
selling perspective, may make it difficult to state categorically that there is a 
correspondence between contrarian and informed trading and that sell trades when 
returns are negative represent uninformed activity. 
Given the above considerations, we think that today’s volatility depends on 
contemporary and lagged variables. The results of Chen and Daigler [2008] or Kao and 
Fung [2012] show that information is a key factor in the relationship between volatility 
and volume and that those theories which explain this relationship are not exclusive, but 
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complementary. These authors, using intraday data, find a significant contemporaneous 
relationship between volume and volatility, consistent with the mixture-of-distributions 
hypothesis that links volume of trading with the arrival of new information events 
(Clark, [1973], Epps and Epps [1976], and Tauchen and Pitt [1983]). They also find a 
significant relationship between lagged volume and volatility, behaviour that is 
consistent with the hypothesis of sequential information arrival in the markets (Foster 
[1995], Wang and Yau [2000]). In turn, both the mixture-of-distributions hypothesis 
and the sequential information arrival hypothesis are consistent with both the hypothesis 
of dispersion of expectations (Harris and Raviv [1993], Shalen [1993]) in which 
informed and uninformed agents react to the same information in different ways, and 
the asymmetric information hypothesis (Daigler and Wiley [1999], Downing and Zang 
[2004]) which suggests that informed agents position themselves at one side of the 
market, reducing volatility. 
Therefore, to maintain this structure of complementary hypotheses we consider both 
contemporary and lagged relationships to be relevant (which is why we incorporate the 
change in the proportion of informed transactions into the model), together with the 
separation between informed agents both for buy and sell positions, given that both 
types of transaction derive from different information events or alternative processing of 
the same information. 
Furthermore, the ACG06 model uses sales transactions assuming a complementary 
behaviour to that of buying transactions. This is because transactions without price 
changes are included in one of the two classifications (buy or sell). However, the so-
called “zero-tick” transactions are more difficult to classify as informed or imitative. 
We therefore think it is important to exclude them from the group and consider them 
separately. When separating transactions without a change in price, the buy and sell 
transactions are no longer complementary and thus we need to find an alternative 
proposal for the variable representing informed trading. Given that we have the 
probability of informed trading available, we can calculate the number of informed 
transactions multiplying the PIN estimate by the number of strictly buy and sell 
transactions.  
Our proposal for the informed trading variable is what we might call the “variation of 
the proportion of informed transactions”, that is the ratio between strictly informed buy 
or sell transactions (leaving aside zero-tick transactions) and the total number of 
transactions completed in the trading session. The intention is to use a measure free of 
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the bias that could be introduced by transactions with no price change or by transactions 
that may respond to mimetic behaviour or to other reasons than good or bad news 
arriving in the markets during the same session.  



































where NSit  is the number of sales transactions of stock i on day t, NBit  is the number 
of buying transactions of stock i on day t and NTit is the total the number of buying 
transactions of stock i on day t and NTit is the total number of transactions of stock i on 
day t. The model incorporates in a manner analogous to that of ACG06 the volatility 
persistence that is determined by the coefficients k and the element associated with 






encapsulates our proposal 
for the “minimal proportion of informed transactions” variable. Note that this variable is 
included in the model in incremental terms. The object of the proposal is to determine 
how variations in informed trading influence volatility during a session. Also note that 
PINit is an annual estimation calculated using intraday data. The use of daily data in eq. 
10 requires daily information about the number of transactions so that the proportion of 
informed transactions can be calculated at this frequency leaving aside zero-tick 
transactions. 
Following the premises set out above, increases in informed trading might be 
expected to reduce volatility on approximating the prices to their fundamentals and 
correcting possible deviations caused by uninformed trading.  
Panel A in Table V shows the results of our alternative proposal, in which informed 
trading is calculated as the variation of a minimal proportion of informed transactions 
through the PIN variable. The results of the estimations obtained provide more 
convincing conclusions than those obtained previously. In addition to the 
autocorrelation of volatility and the importance of volume, already observed in the 
ACG06 approximation, the variable associated with informed trading is significant and 
negative in larger-sized stocks.  Examining the stocks analyzed by capitalization, we see 
that all the stocks belonging to the first quintile unanimously suggest that informed 
transactions tend to reduce volatility. This effect falls to 89% in the second quintile. 
That is, the volatility of those stocks that exhibit lower PIN values is significantly 
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reduced when informed investors trade. The percentage of significant negative estimates 
notably decreases for those quintiles formed by smaller capitalization stocks. Then, we 
can conclude that there is a noticeable relationship among volatility changes, informed 
trading and firm size. Therefore, our estimations lead to the conclusion that informed 
trading, in accordance with a strict definition of market efficiency, contributes to the 
reduction in volatility and the movement of prices towards their fundamentals, 
particularly in large capitalization stocks that are more familiar to investors. 
The results are consistent with the suggestions of Poskitt [2005], Marsh et al [2008] 
and Lai et al [2014] who show a negative relationship between volatility and informed 
trading. Moreover, the result is also consistent with the findings of Blasco et al [2012] 
for the Spanish market in which it was found that the presence of herding increased 
market volatility, particularly in familiar stocks. According to our results in this paper, 
informed trading should correct this reaction, reducing volatility. This means that in 
those stocks where herding is more likely to occur, the corrective effect of informed 
traders is easily appreciated. 
Informed trading is lower when there is greater informative transparency (Lai et al 
[2009, 2014]) and it therefore depends on the informative quality surrounding it. The 
greater the informative transparency, the lesser the incentive to dedicate additional 
efforts to achieving more accurate and higher quality information. We have detected a 
lower degree of informative efficiency in our market so that the expected effect of the 
PIN and the informed transactions would be greater than in other markets such as the 
American market. The result obtained is not so clear when we observe the market as a 
whole, but it is clear in relation to the group of stocks with higher capitalisation 
gathered in the larger size quintiles.    
The result may also be compatible with that obtained for the USA market as a whole. 
The size of companies in the American market is greater than the size of Spanish 
companies. In the USA, informed trading affects stocks as a whole. If in the Spanish 
market the range of company sizes is more varied and, in general, Spanish companies 
are smaller in size, it is possible that for Spanish companies as a whole the effect is 
undetected. However, it is detected for those companies whose size approaches that of 
American companies. Therefore, size can be not very significant in the USA market 
when the influence of informed trading is analysed, but in smaller markets this variable 
is an important element to be considered.   
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Given that in the Spanish market the larger companies with better informative 
quality, i.e. those with similar characteristics to American companies, are those which 
offer results similar to those of American companies, it is worth reflecting on the need 
for a minimum size, a minimum level of informative transparency and perhaps a 
minimum transaction size in order to be able to detect the influence of variations in 
informed trading on volatility. 
Thus, the effect of informed trading on volatility in stock markets with a wide range 
of listed companies is particularly noticeable in those stocks with better informative 
quality that, in turn, induces uninformed traders to participate, even following herding 
strategies. This is because they consider that the specialized processing of information 
does not provide significant economic profits. In contrast, those stocks that are listed in 
such stock markets and exhibit lower informative quality basically attract informed 
investors and their marginal effect on volatility is hardly detected. 
The time period analysed has various sub-periods marked by the outbreak of the 
financial crisis at the end of 2007. We therefore consider it appropriate to study the 
robustness of the results obtained repeating the analysis for the period 2008-2010. The 
results are shown in panel B in Table V. It can be seen that the results obtained confirm 
the robustness of the estimations included in panel A. The intensity of the effect of the 
volatility correction on the stocks belonging to the first quintile is clear, as are the 
general conclusions with respect to the other quintiles.  
 
4.4- Results using autoregressive conditional variance 
An alternative estimation is proposed using autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity models. Specifically, the following GARCH(1,1) model is used, 
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The mean and variance equations include the usual elements in addition to the 
variables described above. This proposal attempts on the one hand to simplify into one 
step the two-step estimation procedure of the previous test and, on the other hand, to 
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provide complementary information about the influence of informed trading on returns 
when using conditional volatility. This all serves to add robustness to the results of the 
previous proposal. 
Table VI shows the model estimation results, including the variation in the informed 
trading variable both in the mean and in the variance equations. For the mean equation 
only the results relating to the lags in returns and to informed trading are shown. These 
enable us to detect on the one hand the correlation of the negative sign of the return in 
the mean equation. On the other hand, the variable used to measure informed trading 
does not provide clear evidence about its influence in this equation, so it is difficult to 
interpret. However, when analysing the variance equation, the coefficients obtained 
corroborate the previous results given that a significant influence of informed trading on 
price variations is clearly shown. The inferences of the results on this variable coincide 
almost entirely with those obtained in the previous section, despite the differences in the 
volatility estimation procedure. The analysis following the capitalization criteria leads 
us to similar conclusions to those suggested for Table V. Therefore, it can be said that 
the volatility of heavily traded stocks is seen to be affected by informed trading. Highly 
capitalized and heavily traded stocks, that is, familiar stocks that usually attract higher 
herding levels, correct their higher volatility levels when informed traders move prices 
towards their fundamentals.  
Bandi and Russell [2006] suggest that asset prices can be written as the sum of 
efficient prices and a noise component that is induced by microstructure frictions. Then, 
the variance of returns depends on both the variance of the underlying efficient returns 
and the variance of the microstructure noise components. Whereas the variance of the 
efficient return process is a crucial ingredient in the practice and theory of asset 
valuation and risk management, herding is considered a microstructure component that 
can be used to consistently estimate the microstructure noise variance. Informed traders 
should help to reduce the microstructure component of volatility and to determine the 
proper asset valuation of those stocks that are herding attractors.  
These results confirm the need for greater accuracy in the measurement of informed 
trading since, as can be seen, the results vary depending on the approximation 
considered. The proposal here represents progress in this direction, trying to resolve 
limitations detected in previous studies by not having to make assumptions about 
investor behaviour and considering as a marker of informed trading the variation in the 
proportion of informed transactions, calculated through a variable already accepted in 
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The empirical evidence revealed in this paper represents a contribution to the 
literature that combines microstructure and investor behaviour in the financial markets. 
The main objective is to analyse the relationship between informed trading and 
volatility using an alternative proposal to that previously used in the literature. This 
proposal includes the PIN variable in the calculation of informed transactions. The 
Spanish market from January 1997 to December 2010 was analysed. This market 
provides an ideal setting for the analysis because the existence of herding and its 
influence on volatility in this market has been demonstrated (Blasco et al [2012]). 
Furthermore, the lower degree of informative transparency in the Spanish market 
compared to the American makes for interesting results from the perspective of 
examining the relation between volatility and informed trading in more opaque markets 
than those usually studied. 
The methodology is based on the proposal of ACG06 which is modified by 
transforming the informed trading variable by means of the proportion of informed 
transactions calculated through the probability of informed trading (PIN). The idea is to 
find a less restrictive measure of informed trading that can be applied in stock markets 
with different informative environment. Additionally, a model of autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity is tested incorporating a representation of informed 
trading. As well as changes in the methodology, the work discusses types of stocks and 
their effect on the relation between volatility and informed trading, an aspect which has 
proved to be of great significance.  
The results obtained using the ACG06 proposal does not show that informed trading 
affects volatility. This leads us to suppose that the differences between the conclusions 
reached by these authors and our own results are due to the fact that the methodology 
used by ACG06 is not appropriate for capturing this effect in all markets. However, 
using the change in the proportion of informed transactions through the PIN variable in 
the classification of the trading produces results which are much more consistent with 
those expected. It can be said that, in general, the effect of informed trading is to reduce 
volatility during the trading session for familiar stocks, these being highly capitalized 
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and heavily traded. The results are the same when the influence of the crisis is analysed, 
when estimations of informed trading over different time periods are used and when the 
estimation of volatility is made using the conditional volatility model. Informed trading 
seems to be particularly significant for stabilizing prices of those large stocks traded by 
uninformed traders who usually prefer familiar stocks which, in the case of the Spanish 
market, are those which, at least, maintain a size and an informative quality comparable 
with large markets. This is because uninformed traders consider that the specialized 
processing of information for these stocks does not provide significant economic 
profits. However, the presence of informed traders does not influence the volatility of 
those stocks already traded by informed traders, usually small firms. In this case, the 
marginal effect of informed trading on volatility is hardly detected. 
The results are of interest in so far as they can help to improve the prediction of 
future volatility. This will enable more accurate interpretation of risk and a clearer 
definition of management strategies. If investors are able to include this information in 
their volatility prediction models, they will then be able to improve investment decision-
making and portfolio or risk management. The regulators will have a better 
understanding of the variables which affect information asymmetries and will then be 
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Table I. Mean estimation of the parameters ,  , b, s, and  of the PIN variable. 











 0.3483 16.28% 0.3599 0.3072 
 0.4793 14.99% 0.4716 0.5097 
εb 119.3713 23.79% 116.9655 129.1942 
εs 132.7937 42.09% 110.4391 211.8458 




Table II. Estimation of the PIN variable for stocks according to capitalization. 











(First and second quintiles) 12.44% 4.16% 7.17% 
Medium Stocks 
(Third quintile). 14.51% 4.51% 5.70% 
Small Stocks 
(Fourth and fifth quintiles) 21.50% 8.61% 15.36% 
 
 
Panel B. Period 1997-2010 split into before and during/after financial crisis periods. 
 Annual frecuency. 
 
 1997-2007 2008-2010 
Large Stocks 
(First and second quintiles) 12.19% 13.50% 
Medium Stocks 
(Third quintile). 13.58% 17.49% 
Small Stocks 
(Fourth and fifth quintiles) 20.65% 28.33% 
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Table III.-Results of regression of returns Rit of stock i on day t, where Dkt are the dummy variables 
corresponding to each day of the week, Rit-k are the lags in returns, NSit is the number of sales transactions of 
stock i on day t and NTit the total number of transactions of stock ion day t. 
1=Monday,2=Tuesday,3=Wednesday,4=Thursday,5=Friday. 1 and 2 are the coefficients of the first and 























Capitalization  a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 b1 b2 c 
Large 
Quintile 1 Mean estimate 0.0099 0.0108 0.0101 0.0099 0.0102 0.0374 -0.0427 -0.0718 
 Standard deviation 0.99% 0.94% 1.04% 0.93% 0.94% 5.20% 1.91% 6.01% 
 Mean p-value 0.1877 0.2027 0.2133 0.1861 0.2158 0.1425 0.1669 0.1973 
 %of 10%  sig. estim. 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 69% 74% 78% 
Quintile 2 Mean estimate 0.0185 0.0190 0.0195 0.0192 0.0197 -0.1015 -0.0409 -0.1158 
 Standard deviation 0.99% 0.99% 0.99% 1.05% 1.07% 18.83% 5.91% 6.12% 
 Mean p-value 0.0167 0.0063 0.0083 0.0066 0.0262 0.1910 0.1842 0.0160 
 %of 10%  sig. estim. 100% 100% 100% 100% 81% 61% 64% 100% 
Quintile 3 Mean estimate 0.0252 0.0238 0.0249 0.0248 0.0254 0.0463 -0.0083 -0.1494 
 Standard deviation 1.40% 1.32% 1.50% 1.43% 1.47% 3.90% 3.22% 9.72% 
 Mean p-value 0.0000 0.0007 0.0032 0.0003 0.0001 0.1772 0.2536 0.0000 
 %of 10%  sig. estim. 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 52% 37% 100% 
Quintile 4 Mean estimate 0.0225 0.0209 0.0213 0.0208 0.0213 -0.0212 -0.0032 -0.1091 
 Standard deviation 2.01% 1.90% 1.85% 1.85% 1.92% 5.75% 4.09% 9.73% 
 Mean p-value 0.1049 0.1080 0.0021 0.0826 0.0989 0.1354 0.3320 0.0000 
 %of 10%  sig. estim. 89% 89% 100% 89% 89% 66% 23% 100% 
Small 
Quintile 5 Mean estimate 0.0070 0.0070 0.0064 0.0065 0.0067 -0.0859 -0.0240 -0.0402 
 Standard deviation 0.59% 0.61% 0.62% 0.59% 0.58% 9.17% 3.31% 3.02% 
 Mean p-value 0.1807 0.1895 0.1602 0.1587 0.2457 0.0026 0.3963 0.1485 











Table IV. -Results of the volatility model estimation according to ACG06. 

















































    
 
Capitalization    1 2 3 c d0 d1 d2 
 Mean estimate -0.0013 0.0022 -0.0598 0.0631 0.0727 1.2E-06 0.0010 0.3885 -0.7138 
Large 
Quintile 1 Stand. dev. 0.39% 0.21% 22.29% 3.30% 1.20% 0.00% 14.97% 147.14% 291.91% 
 Mean p-value 0.0869 0.1477 0.2058 0.2098 0.0368 0.0000 0.2136 0.1853 0.0131 
 %. of 10% sig. 73% 79% 71% 66% 74% 100% 48% 71% 92% 
 Mean estimate 0.0025 0.0005 -0.0279 0.0755 0.0368 3.1E-06 -0.0050 1.3479 -1.0888 
Quintile 2 Stand. dev. 0.25% 0.11% 10.78% 3.03% 4.24% 0.00% 9.44% 124.85% 107.18% 
 Mean p-value 0.0052 0.4543 0.2760 0.0932 0.0597 0.0001 0.3263 0.2091 0.3617 
 %. of 10% sig. 100% 16% 54% 84% 94% 100% 20% 38% 58% 
 Mean estimate 0.0023 0.0008 0.0128 0.0901 0.0605 1.0E-05 -0.0249 0.9166 -0.3994 
Quintile 3 Stand. dev. 0.26% 0.09% 14.00% 5.58% 1.35% 0.00% 14.70% 153.49% 134.97% 
 Mean p-value 0.1339 0.4320 0.1797 0.0967 0.0466 0.0000 0.4629 0.0471 0.1589 
 %. of 10% sig. 74% 25% 65% 85% 85% 100% 24% 91% 46% 
 Mean estimate 0.0012 0.0016 0.1944 0.0863 0.0486 5.6E-05 0.0082 -0.5490 0.1892 
Quintile 4 Stand. dev. 0.25% 0.19% 11.21% 6.07% 6.64% 0.01% 10.87% 62.42% 126.20% 
 Mean p-value 0.3931 0.2072 0.1368 0.1365 0.1603 0.0000 0.2187 0.3198 0.1218 
 %. of 10% sig. 48% 36% 69% 79% 65% 100% 24% 33% 75% 
 Mean estimate 0.0054 0.0010 0.1038 0.0564 0.0356 9.4E-05 -0.0142 0.1123 -0.4082 
Small 
Quintile 5 Stand. dev. 0.20% 0.10% 10.11% 2.88% 2.22% 0.01% 4.31% 35.13% 49.75% 
 Mean p-value 0.0000 0.2925 0.1158 0.0332 0.2568 0.0000 0.4446 0.5402 0.2282 
 %. of 10% sig. 100% 64% 76% 94% 66% 100% 31% 29% 63% 
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Table V. Results of the volatility model estimation using the PIN variable. 
Stocks are ranked by capitalization. For clarity, only the results for the first three lagged variables u i,t are presented. 
 


































Capitalization   1 2 3    
 
 Mean estimate 0.0031 0.0967 0.1207 0.1373 1.1E-06 -0.2869 % negative. estim. 100% 
Large Standard deviation 0.15% 6.07% 4.56% 2.22% 0.00% 19.93% signif.neg.estim. 100% 
Quintile 1 Mean p-value 0.1386 0.1180 0.0300 0.0002 0.0000 0.0151 signif.pos.estim. 0% 




Mean estimate 0.0046 0.1808 0.0937 0.0939 2.8E-06 -0.0830 % negative. estim. 89% 
Standard deviation 0.20% 15.32% 6.48% 4.83% 0.00% 7.27% signif.neg.estim. 100% 
Mean p-value 0.0028 0.0406 0.1149 0.0385 0.0171 0.0729 signif.pos.estim. 0% 




Mean estimate 0.0046 0.1501 0.1163 0.0906 1.0E-05 -0.0151 % negative. estim. 46% 
Standard deviation 0.26% 6.92% 5.65% 2.82% 0.00% 4.30% signif.neg.estim. 80% 
Mean p-value 0.0439 0.0356 0.1431 0.0529 0.0002 0.4204 signif.pos.estim. 7% 
Percent. of 10% signif. estim. 85% 85% 85% 85% 100% 44% 
  
 Mean estimate 0.0036 0.1579 0.1015 0.0717 5.6E-05 0.0240 % negative. estim. 0% 
 Standard deviation 0.24% 5.86% 6.34% 6.52% 0.01% 2.06% signif.neg.estim. 0% 
Quintile 4 Mean p-value 0.0407 0.0133 0.1369 0.1282 0.0000 0.5299 signif.pos.estim. 0% 
 Percent. of 10% signif. estim. 84% 100% 84% 73% 100% 0% 
  
 Mean estimate 0.0070 0.1558 0.0669 0.0523 8.9E-05 -0.0205 % negative. estim. 65% 
Small Standard deviation 0.24% 5.15% 2.81% 2.64% 0.01% 3.78% signif.neg.estim. 45% 
Quintile 5 Mean p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0129 0.1183 0.0000 0.3661 signif.pos.estim. 32% 






Panel B. Results of the  estimation in the volatility model for the period 2008-2010 




Quintile 1  -0.2587 0.0560 91% 86% 
Quintile 2 -0.1097 0.3150 100% 28% 
Quintile 3 0.0117 0.5439 29% 0% 
Quintile 4 0.0258 0.5046 9% 0% 
Quintile 5 










































































vNTu   
 
  Equation of the mean Equation of the variance   
Capitalization a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 b1 b2 c        




0.09% 0.14% 0.06% 0.11% 0.13% 5.41% 1.91% 30.08% 0.00% 6.61% 29.32% 0.00% 0.32% sig.neg.estim. 100% 
 Mean p-value 0.5077 0.4709 0.4890 0.3768 0.4653 0.2119 0.3523 0.1306 0.3621 0.0002 0.1029 0.0915 0.0772 sig.pos.estim. 0% 
 %. of 10% 
signif. 9% 0% 35% 44% 21% 65% 53% 92% 43% 100% 92% 78% 88%   
 Mean estimate 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008 0.0028 0.0000 -0.0640 -0.0356 -0.0061 0.0000 0.1385 0.6294 1.8E-08 -0.0004 % neg.estim. 45% 
Q2 Stand. deviat. 0.13% 0.25% 0.11% 0.48% 0.32% 13.19% 8.27% 8.64% 0.01% 9.15% 33.55% 0.00% 0.27% sig.neg.estim. 100% 
 Mean p-value 0.1455 0.3365 0.4248 0.2467 0.2430 0.1712 0.4427 0.2868 0.1529 0.0000 0.0004 0.0773 0.0759 sig.pos.estim. 49% 
 %. of 10% 
signif. 50% 33% 32% 57% 33% 70% 30% 45% 57% 100% 100% 81% 72%   
 Mean estimate 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0023 -0.0060 -0.0006 0.0000 0.1615 0.5541 2.7E-07 -0.0008 % neg.estim. 61% 
Q3 Stand. deviat. 0.07% 0.11% 0.07% 0.15% 0.07% 4.00% 2.14% 8.21% 0.01% 8.01% 38.39% 0.00% 0.17% sig.neg.estim. 75% 
 Mean p-value 0.6241 0.3248 0.4948 0.4143 0.3319 0.4101 0.5714 0.3033 0.0114 0.0307 0.0006 0.0000 0.1229 sig.pos.estim. 61% 
 %. of 10% 
signif. 0% 0% 11% 7% 36% 20% 0% 52% 89% 85% 100% 100% 70%   
 Mean estimate 0.0003 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0459 -0.0344 -0.0074 0.0000 0.2332 0.4221 9.3E-07 0.0010 % neg.estim. 0% 
Q4 Stand. deviat. 0.13% 0.10% 0.19% 0.15% 0.14% 7.86% 3.00% 4.11% 0.01% 9.85% 30.78% 0.00% 0.12% sig.neg.estim. 0% 
 Mean p-value 0.3857 0.3931 0.2997 0.3755 0.4813 0.2142 0.2529 0.5281 0.1629 0.0000 0.0673 0.0600 0.2333 sig.pos.estim. 43% 
 %. of 10% 
signif. 25% 21% 22% 0% 0% 46% 9% 11% 75% 100% 83% 89% 43%   




0.08% 0.10% 0.13% 0.15% 0.10% 11.01% 4.76% 0.71% 0.01% 8.31% 29.08% 0.00% 0.08% sig.neg.estim. 100% 
 Mean p-value 0.3201 0.2247 0.1345 0.2889 0.3072 0.1366 0.2323 0.3556 0.0000 0.0000 0.0792 0.0000 0.0114 sig.pos.estim. 100% 
 %. of 10% 
signif. 25.00% 25.00% 62.50% 50.00% 37.50% 87.50% 62.50% 12.50% 100.00% 100.00% 75.00% 100.00% 100.00%   
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